Defamation, Allegations, and Public Interest: The Trial of Mr Lehrmann vs. Network Ten

QUICK ANSWER:

Quick answer: Bruce Lehrmann’s defamation case against Network Ten and journalist Lisa Wilkinson is over. In April 2024, Justice Michael Lee of the Federal Court found that Network Ten’s truth defence succeeded, ruling that, on the balance of probabilities, Mr Lehrmann raped Brittany Higgins (Lehrmann v Network Ten Pty Limited (Trial Judgment) [2024] FCA 369). The Full Federal Court dismissed Mr Lehrmann’s appeal in December 2025 ([2025] FCAFC 173), and the High Court refused him special leave to appeal in April 2026, making the decision final.

In connection with a 2021 interview featuring Brittany Higgins, Mr Lehrmann filed a defamation lawsuit against Network Ten and journalist Lisa Wilkinson over an episode of The Project that he said conveyed the imputation he had raped Ms Higgins. In this article, our Litigation and Dispute Resolution team revisits the case from filing through to its final resolution in the High Court, and unpacks what the outcome means for the truth defence, qualified privilege, and the newer public interest defence under Australian defamation law.

THE LEHRMAN DEFAMATION TRIAL

Mr Lehrmann instigated an action in defamation against Network Ten and Ms Lisa Wilkinson over an episode of The Project that aired an interview with Ms Brittany Higgins in February 2021, during which the interview conveyed imputations that she had been raped in a Parliament House office two years earlier. While Ms Higgins never expressly named Mr Lehrmann, the surrounding circumstances and details led to his identification. Mr Lehrmann had earlier maintained his innocence throughout a criminal trial. He pleaded not guilty to one charge of sexual intercourse without consent, before prosecutors discontinued that trial due to juror misconduct and later abandoned a retrial on health grounds relating to Ms Higgins.

Network Ten and Ms Wilkinson relied on the defences of truth and qualified privilege. They argued that the imputation that Mr Lehrmann raped Ms Higgins was substantially accurate, noting that the standard of proof in civil defamation proceedings is markedly lower than in criminal matters. In the context of the qualified privilege defence, they argued the program was in the public interest, given Mr Lehrmann’s position as a former Liberal staffer and Ms Higgins’ status as a notable public figure, and that they had otherwise acted reasonably in broadcasting the publication.

THE VERDICT: JUSTICE LEE’S APRIL 2024 JUDGMENT

On 15 April 2024, Justice Michael Lee handed down judgment in Lehrmann v Network Ten Pty Limited (Trial Judgment) [2024] FCA 369, dismissing Mr Lehrmann’s claim in its entirety. Justice Lee found that the truth (or justification) defence was made out: on the balance of probabilities, Mr Lehrmann and Ms Higgins had non-consensual sexual intercourse, given her inebriated and semi-conscious state at the time. His Honour was famously blunt in his assessment of the evidence, describing Mr Lehrmann as a “persistent, self-interested liar” while acknowledging that Ms Higgins’ own evidence was not without its own credibility issues, particularly given the effects of trauma on memory.

Because the truth defence succeeded, Justice Lee found it unnecessary to determine Network Ten’s separate public interest defence under section 29A. He did, however, reject the defence of qualified privilege, finding that the conduct of Network Ten and Ms Wilkinson did not meet the standard required to sustain it (discussed further below). Mr Lehrmann was ordered to pay Network Ten’s and Ms Wilkinson’s costs of the trial, reported to run into the millions of dollars.

THE APPEALS: FULL FEDERAL COURT AND HIGH COURT

Mr Lehrmann appealed the decision to the Full Court of the Federal Court on four grounds. On 3 December 2025, the Full Court unanimously dismissed the appeal in Lehrmann v Network Ten Pty Limited [2025] FCAFC 173. The appellate bench went further than Justice Lee, with Justice Wigney finding that Mr Lehrmann had actual knowledge, rather than mere recklessness, that Ms Higgins was not consenting, observing that the circumstances “screamed loudly to anyone with normal faculties” that she had not consented. Mr Lehrmann was ordered to pay the further costs of the appeal, on top of the costs already owing from the trial.

Mr Lehrmann then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. In April 2026, the High Court refused special leave, closing off any further avenue of appeal. With two Federal Court judgments and a refusal of special leave all standing against him, the finding that, on the balance of probabilities, Mr Lehrmann raped Ms Higgins is now final.

DEFAMATION OVERVIEW

A cause of action in defamation may be brought where material is communicated to the public at large which causes serious harm to the reputation of an individual, in circumstances where the allegations against them are untrue. In Mr Lehrmann’s case, he needed to establish that the episode of The Project conveyed defamatory imputations, including that:

1. the matter complained of bore a defamatory meaning (whether directly or indirectly);
2. the matter identified or concerned him specifically;
3. the matter was published to at least one other party; and
4. the publication caused, or was likely to cause, serious harm to his reputation.

A national framework of model defamation provisions was enacted in 2005, with each Australian State and Territory adopting a corresponding version. A series of staged amendments has since modernised the cause of action to align with social media and internet usage, marked by the landmark High Court decisions of Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Voller & ors [2021] HCA 27 (‘Fairfax v Voller’) and Google LLC v Defteros [2022] HCA 27. Since this article was first published, a further round of “Stage 2” reforms dealing with the liability of digital platforms, hosts and search engines for third-party content has been progressively rolled out across the States and Territories, with Queensland’s implementing Bill introduced in October 2025.

The current landscape ensures broad consistency across Australian States and Territories while incorporating significant amendments to the action itself, including revisions to the list of statutory defences available to defendants. As a plaintiff must prove publication of the alleged defamatory material, a defendant can in turn rely on defences that rebut liability. The defences most relevant to the Lehrmann case are explained below.

PUBLIC INTEREST DEFENCE

The public interest defence, introduced in section 29A of the Uniform Defamation Acts, was considered in detail in Russell v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 3) [2023] FCA 1223. That case confirmed that the defence turns on the publisher’s honest and reasonable belief in the truth of a publication (rather than the objective truth of it), a holistic assessment of whether the reporting was overall reasonable, and whether the publisher took adequate steps to keep itself informed of matters relevant to that belief. Where a publisher’s belief in the legitimacy of the publication is reasonable and supported by substantiated evidence, the publication is likely to be found within the public interest.

Network Ten pleaded the public interest defence in the Lehrmann proceedings, but because Justice Lee found the truth defence made out, his Honour did not need to, and did not, decide whether the public interest defence would independently have succeeded. The defence therefore remains a developing area of the law, and Russell continues to be the leading authority on how it operates in practice.

QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE

The defence of qualified privilege protects the publication of defamatory material where the defendant proves that the intended audience had an interest in the information and that the defendant’s conduct in publishing it was reasonable in the circumstances. The defence is defeated if the court finds the defendant published with malice.

To make out qualified privilege, a defendant must satisfy the court that the occasion was privileged, in the sense that the relationship between publisher and audience gave rise to a duty, whether legal, moral or social, to communicate the information to the world at large. In the Lehrmann proceedings, Network Ten and Ms Wilkinson argued the broadcast was in the public interest given Mr Lehrmann’s and Ms Higgins’ public profiles, and that they had acted reasonably in broadcasting it. Justice Lee ultimately rejected this defence, finding the conduct in question did not meet the standard of reasonableness the defence requires, a reminder that qualified privilege remains a difficult defence for mass-media publishers to sustain even where the subject matter is plainly newsworthy.

DEFENCE OF JUSTIFICATION (OR THE ‘TRUTH’ DEFENCE)

The defence of truth (or justification) is made out where the defendant proves that the defamatory imputations carried by the matter complained of are substantially true. In practice, this means the defendant must prove that an imputation of fact is true, or that an imputation of opinion is an accurate reflection of a genuinely held view. The defendant is not required to prove the literal truth of every detail, only the substantial truth of the material facts, assessed by reference to the standard of an ordinary reasonable person.

This was the defence that ultimately succeeded in the Lehrmann proceedings. Justice Lee found that, notwithstanding concerns about aspects of Ms Higgins’ evidence, the overall evidence supported a finding that, on the balance of probabilities, Mr Lehrmann engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with her. That finding was upheld, and strengthened, by the Full Court on appeal, and is now final following the High Court’s refusal of special leave. The outcome illustrates a point defamation lawyers make often: a defendant does not need to disprove every element of a plaintiff’s account, only establish that the sting of the publication is substantially true on the civil standard of proof.

KEY TAKEAWAYS FOR ANYONE CONSIDERING A DEFAMATION CLAIM

The Lehrmann litigation is a useful illustration of the risks inherent in defamation proceedings for both sides. For a plaintiff, bringing a claim invites the defendant to test the truth of the underlying allegations to a civil standard, which can result in adverse factual findings far more damaging than the original publication. For a media defendant, successfully defending a claim on the truth defence does not guarantee that qualified privilege or the public interest defence would also succeed, and publishers should not assume the newer public interest defence in section 29A will assist them without a properly documented, reasonable process behind the publication. Anyone weighing up a defamation claim, whether as a prospective plaintiff or a publisher facing one, should obtain tailored legal advice before taking any step that cannot easily be undone.

RAMSDEN LAWYERS – HOW WE CAN HELP

Whether you’ve been affected by defamation or are concerned about potential liability for a previous publication, our Litigation and Dispute Resolution team has considerable expertise in defamation actions for both claimants and defendants. We are happy to arrange an obligation-free initial consultation to help you navigate the relevant legislation for your circumstances.

The content of this article is intended to provide general guidance on the subject matter and must not be relied on as legal advice. Specific advice about your circumstances should be sought.